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U.S. labor markets traditionally 
have included long-term employment 
relationships that last many years 
or decades. They also have been 
characterized by internal labor 
markets, unions, and a web of rules 
that, often by law, both employers and 
workers are required to observe. New 
innovations and technologies, such as 
smart phones and their accompanying 
apps, have allowed labor markets to 
become more fluid and responsive 
to spot market supply and demand 
conditions. They have allowed workers 
more flexibility in their choice of hours 
worked, and have allowed consumers 
to better evaluate the quality of 
services. As a result, gig labor markets, 
which let workers easily book jobs by 
the hour or project, have grown and 
flourished. The number of workers 
directly working through apps now 
comprise nearly 1 percent of the total 
workforce, making gig labor markets 
one of the fastest growing areas in the 
labor force (Katz and Krueger 2016; 
Torpey and Hogan 2016). 
Workers who have entered the 
gig labor market have few of the 
government regulations or web of 
rules that govern traditional labor 
markets. In addition, labor laws such as 
the Fair Labor Standards Act and the 
National Labor Relations Act usually 
do not apply to these workers (Harris 
and Krueger 2015). Yet one area of 
labor market regulation, occupational 
licensing, is pervasive, and in this 
article, I examine the interaction of this 
institution in one large company that 
operates largely in the gig economy.  
The Uber Innovation
The ride-sharing firm Uber 
has come to exemplify the recent 
technology “revolution” and labor 
market outcomes embodied in the 
gig economy. It had 84–87 percent 
of the total ride-sharing trips (i.e., 
cab-substitute markets) in 2016 and 
is currently active in 450 cities in 
the United States and worldwide.1 
Uber began offering its first rides in 
2010 in San Francisco and in New 
York City in 2011 as a way to match 
individuals who needed rides to work 
or recreation with those individuals 
who were willing to provide those rides 
for a price. The creation of an app and 
accompanying software allowed this 
matching process to be done in an 
efficient and profitable manner for the 
company (Roth and Ockenfels 2002).  
Uber takes a percentage of the ride 
price for the company as their fee for 
matching the drivers and riders. The 
drivers anticipate an ample supply of 
customers, and the waiting times for 
drivers in traditional cabs were reduced 
and revenues enhanced for those 
Count us among those who believe 
that today’s workers’ compensation 
programs have the potential to serve 
for another 100 years, but they will 
require significant improvement. We 
call upon legislative bodies to address 
current shortcomings, and we call 
upon the research community to 
provide appropriate guidance for these 
efforts. 
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ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS 
n The number of workers directly working through apps now comprise nearly 1 per-
cent of the total workforce, making gig labor markets one of the fastest growing areas 
in the labor force.
n Evidence from a quasi-experiment in New York and New Jersey suggests that 
there are few gains from occupational licensing of ride-sharing providers as assessed 
through customer satisfaction or measures of customer safety.
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Analysis for Its Second Century
5on the quality of services (Kleiner 
and Kudrle 2000). However, a recent 
analysis in the New York City/New 
Jersey area notes that drivers who 
sign up to drive on the Uber app can 
perform pickups in New Jersey, which 
is directly on the opposite side of the 
Hudson River from New York City, 
but drivers who sign-up in New Jersey, 
which does not require an occupational 
license, cannot perform pickups in the 
city (Hall et al. 2017). Thus, the study 
compares quality and safety outcomes 
for rides performed in New Jersey by 
New York City and New Jersey drivers. 
There is quasi-random assignment 
of rides because Uber’s dispatch 
algorithm, which determines the driver 
for a particular ride request, is based 
on factors other than licensing. While 
the algorithm has evolved over time, it 
is mainly based on a driver’s proximity 
to a rider’s location (also based on time 
to the customer). Consequently, a ride 
is essentially randomly assigned to a 
licensed driver from New York City or 
an unlicensed driver from New Jersey 
for pick-up requests that occur in many 
EMPLOYMENT RESEARCH  •  JULY 2017 W.E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE
providing rides. Drivers can choose 
when and how many hours they want 
to work.  In 2017 the company had 
more than 734,000 active drivers in the 
United States and more than 1,500,000 
drivers worldwide.2 The economic 
value of the company is estimated to be 
almost $70 billion, and despite recent 
negative publicity, it is still one of the 
major economic success stories and 
labor market innovators (Bensinger 
2017).
One unique aspect of the Uber 
performance evaluation system is that 
the customer evaluates the driver and 
vice-versa on a scale of one to five, with 
five being the highest. The majority—
nearly 86 percent—of drivers earn 
a rating of 5. Drivers and customers 
whose ratings fall below a specified 
value determined by the company lose 
their ability to access the app and are 
effectively fired from using the ride-
sharing system. Consequently, there 
are incentives for both customers and 
drivers to do well in their respective 
roles. 
Regulations for Driving 
One of the major labor market 
issues affecting Uber drivers is 
occupational licensing (Porter 
2015). About one-quarter of the U.S. 
workforce must acquire a license from 
the government in order to work 
for pay (Bureau of Labor Statistics 
2016). In some cities—New York, for 
example—ride-sharing without a taxi 
license is illegal. The requirements 
for licensure in New York City are 
stringent, and the licensure process 
takes three months on average, with 
upfront costs of at least $2,000. In 
addition, the driver must complete 
a defensive driving course, pass a 
medical exam, be subjected to a 
drug test, undergo fingerprint and 
background checks, take classes on 
wheelchair-accessible vehicle training, 
acquire a commercial vehicle license, 
and purchase commercial vehicle 
insurance. These substantial fixed costs 
result in fewer drivers but much lower 
turnover rates for Uber drivers in New 
York than in any other U.S. city where 
the company operates; they also result 
in longer working hours (Hall et al. 
2017).  Figure 1 shows driver turnover 
by city. New York City has lower 
turnover, and Houston, which has few 
regulations for drivers, has relatively 
high turnover of drivers.
Figure 2 shows that the ratio of New 
York Uber drivers to the population of 
the city or the metropolitan statistical 
area is considerably lower than either 
Chicago or San Francisco, and the base 
prices are higher (Hall et al. 2017). 
Although traditional medallion taxi 
drivers can serve as substitutes for 
Uber drivers in any city, the number 
of Uber drivers in New York is 
considerably lower than in Chicago 
or San Francisco. Also, the base Uber 
fares in Chicago and San Francisco are 
lower than those in New York City for 
both 2015 and 2016. 
Evaluating Quality
One of the least studied areas of 
occupational licensing is its influence 
Figure 1  Percent of Uber Driver-Partners Remaining Active, by City
SOURCE: Uber Technologies, Inc.
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parts of New Jersey. The results of the 
data analysis using the quasi-random 
assignment of rides methodology 
show very little statistically significant 
differences in measured quality by 
riders through measures of rider 
satisfaction. Also, there was little or no 
difference in the safety of rides based 
on the number of driver hard stops, 
rapid accelerations, or complaints to 
the company of poor ride performance, 
based on whether the driver was from 
a jurisdiction that required a license in 
order to work.  
Implications for Policy
Two of the most rapidly growing 
segments of the labor market are 
the growth of the gig economy and 
occupational regulations in the 
labor market through licensing by 
government. Uber is faced with both 
issues because of its business model. 
As current findings suggest, cities that 
impose rigorous licensing standards, 
such as New York, have fewer Uber 
drivers per capita and higher base fares 
than either Chicago or San Francisco. 
The evidence from a quasi-experiment 
in New York and New Jersey suggests 
that there are few gains from 
occupational licensing of ride-sharing 
providers as assessed through customer 
satisfaction or measures of customer 
safety. Before state or local government 
enact additional regulations, access to 
the labor market and its influence on 
customer prices, satisfaction, and safety 
need to be considered as key elements 
of governmental labor market licensing 
policies. 
NOTES
1. DMR Statsitics http://expandedramb 
lings.com/index.php/uber-statistics/ 
(accessed July 7, 2017). 
2. Data provided from company sources, 
June 8, 2017. 
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